Abstract-Recently Zhang et al. proposed a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme which is the first efficient scheme where both ciphertexts and private keys achieve O(1)size, and is the best trade-off between private key size and ciphertext size at present. However, in this paper, it will be pointed out that their scheme exists an ambiguity or shortcoming which makes their scheme be insecure or non identity-based. Then, in order to overcome this problem, an improved hierarchical identity based encryption scheme is proposed with the same efficiency with Zhang et al.'s scheme (the private keys and ciphertexts of O(1)size). And, the security proof of the improved scheme also is given in the selective-identity model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a basic ID-based encryption (IBE) proposed by Shamir [1] , there is a single trusted server, private key generator (PKG), responsible for computing the private key of each user based on his public key. However, using a single PKG is not practical in large scale, so GentrySilverberg [2] extended ID-based encryption to hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE). The notion of the hierarchical ID-based encryption reduces the workload of the root PKG by delegating the private key generation task to lower level entities, i.e., PKGs who have already obtained their private keys. Due to the hierarchical property of HIBE, it is applied in many areas where there are hierarchical administrative issues, such as large companies or e-government systems. Recently HIBE also are applied to Health Record System [3] and cloud computing [4] .
From the first introduction of Gentry-Silverberg, many works have been done on HIBE and many HIBE schemes were proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . However, Zhang et al. [13] pointed out that all previous these schemes have the common drawback that the private key or the cipher text depends on the hierarchy or the maximum hierarchy. In order to overcome the drawback, Zhang et al. recently (2012) proposed a new HIBE scheme based on pairings [18] that ciphertext size as well as the private-key size is independent of the hierarchy depth, which is the first scheme whose private keys and ciphertexts achieve O(1)-size. However, in this paper, we will point out that Zhang et al.'s scheme exists a shortcoming which makes their scheme be insecure or non based on identity. In order to solve this problem, we propose an improved scheme which can overcome the drawback with almost the same efficiency that the private key and the ciphertext size are independent of the hierarchy depth.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Blinear Map
Let G and T G be a cyclic addictive group and a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order p respectively, e be a mapping: G × G → T G which satisfies the following three propertied:
( 
A. ZHANG ET AT's Scheme
In the subsection, we will simply review Zhang et al. HIBE scheme [13] . Their scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup algorithm, Key Generation algorithm, Encryption algorithm and Decryption algorithm. Assume that g is random generator of group G with prime order p , and l is the maximum length of HIBE.
Setup algorithm: Chose randomly 2 
Encryption algorithm: The ciphertext on the message 
B. Security Analysis
In the subsection, we will show the severe security weakness in the Zhang et al. ' 
.in advance to compute the master key h 's authenticity before the encryption user encrypt, which make the identity based scheme change into traditional certification based scheme which is in the contradict with the paper's goal. For two method, PKG i will compute in h for every different
and all level PKG must be online to support the in h access operation from every encryption user, it will largely increase the cost and also is in the contradict with identity based scheme where encryption user can directly use the decryption user's identity information as the public key without accessing PKI or others. So, PKG i also can't compute in h otherwise Zhang et al.'s scheme is non identity based.
IV. IMPROVED SCHEME
A. Our Scheme
In order to solve the previous problem, we propose an improved scheme of Zhanget al.'s HIBE [13] . It consists of four phases. In order to compare easily, we use the same symbols with Zhang et al's scheme.
Setup Phase: Let G be a group generated by g whose order is a prime p , and l be the max height of HIBE and n be the bit number of every identity. Pick 
The private key
computed by PKG i-1 using the private key
) and the shared master key C , 2 C ) for identity k ID and message M , the plain text M can be recovered by using the private key 
B. Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the scheme constructed in the previous subsection is secure in the selective-identity model. 
(2) Setup Phase: B chooses randomly μ ∈ p Z , and 
(3) Query Phase1: In this phase, A is allowed to make E q private key queries. Assuming that 
(2) B first generate the private key of i 
It is obvious that all expression in (1) and (2) 
C. Efficiency Analysis
For simplicity, we use the same comparison items with [13] , and only draw the comparison result with [13] . have less computation complexity than other any one scheme [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] ,and have the same computation complexity with [13] . Thought our scheme needs a little more public parameters than [13] , our scheme overcome the security drawback of Zhang et al's scheme.
D. Implementation
The HIBE of this paper is pairing-based scheme. So, we can use Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [19] which provides routines such as elliptic curve generation, elliptic curve arithmetic and pairing computation to implement our HIBE scheme by choosing suitable Tate pairing. According to PBC, a fastest pairing only needs 11ms on a 1GHz Pentium III. In our scheme, it only needs a pairing operation on the stage of encryption. So, our scheme is very efficient.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we review Zhang et al. ' 
